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
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AGDA-A (M) (5 Feb 71)

OT-UT-71B003

16 February 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] United States Army Support Command, Saigon, Period 25  
September 1969 to 23 November 1970 (U) 8

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10 Harold B. Gibson, Jr.

11 Nov 70

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U)  
dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Harold B. Gibson, Jr., sub-  
ject as above. 12 74p.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized  
from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in  
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be  
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4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a  
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*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM**  
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AVHDO-DO

15 JAN 1971

**SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report -**  
**BG Harold B. Gibson, Jr.**

**Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development**  
**Department of the Army**  
**Washington D. C. 20310**

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by Brigadier General Harold B. Gibson, Jr. The report covers the period 25 September 1969 - 23 November 1970, during which time BG Gibson served as Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Saigon.
2. BG Gibson is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**

Clark W. Stevens Jr.  
 Capt. AGC  
 Assistant Adjutant General

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**DEBRIEFING REPORT**

**of**

**BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD B. GIBSON, JR.**

**COMMANDING GENERAL**

**UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON**

**for period**

**25 SEPTEMBER 1969 THROUGH 23 NOVEMBER 1970**


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FORWARD

Like most of my contemporaries, I have had a variety of assignments during my military service. In my case, I have been extra lucky to have had all good assignments. Of those, my tour with the "Biggest and Best" Support Command has been the biggest and best. I have learned more about things I didn't know I needed to know and at the same time felt a sense of self satisfaction in contributing to the effort in Vietnam. Most importantly, though, I have had the honor, pleasure and privilege of serving with some of America's finest!

  
H. B. GIBSON, JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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## INTRODUCTION

### REFERENCES (U)

- (U) a. Army Regulation 1-26, dated 4 November 1966.
- b. USARV Regulation 1-3, dated 1 June 1968.

### SCOPE (U)

(C) This debriefing covers the highlights of a corps level logistical command in support of United States, Korean, Australian, Thai and Vietnamese Forces during counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam from September 1969 to November 1970.

### MISSION (U)

(C) As one of the four logistical support commands subordinate to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV), the United States Army Support Command, Saigon (SSC) has the mission of providing logistical support and water terminal services to US Army forces and such other US forces and Free World Military Assistance forces, as directed, in III and IV Military Regions, Republic of Vietnam (Inclosures 1 and 2); provide backup support as directed to assist United States Army Support Command, Da Nang; United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon; and the United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. The area covered by logistical activities in III and IV Military Regions is approximately 25,000 square miles. In September 1969, logistical support was provided for approximately 240,000 troops while by November 1970 the number of troops supported was approximately 175,000, due to the phasedown of American activities in Vietnam. Ninety percent of this logistical support was for US forces. This mission includes the support of retrograde of supplies and equipment and redeployment of US Forces and the attendant ARVNization and Vietnamization.

### MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (U)

(U) The missions are as derived from the existing Letter of Instruction to HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon. In each is an understood mission of support of the redeployment of US Forces and the retrograde of supplies and equipment from Vietnam.

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**Major Subordinate Commands (U)**  
(continued)

a. 4th Transportation Command. Provides water terminal services including planning for and conducting of ship discharge and backloading; port clearance of cargo discharged; and marshaling and stowage planning of cargo to be backloaded. Harborcraft and lighterage service constitutes an important second part of the terminal operations mission. Provides motor transport services including daily long-distance highway convoys of all classes of supply to military users throughout Military Regions III and IV.

b. US Army Depot, Long Binh. Provides wholesale Class I, II, IV, VII and IX (less aircraft and marine equipment, avionics, crypto, missiles, maps and AG publications) supply support for US Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces in Military Regions III and IV; included in this mission are the operation of a non-standard repair parts and special services key depot, monitoring of contractor operated facilities in care and preservation of depot stocks; and the operation of a property disposal service for US federal agencies, DOD contractors, US Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces in Military Regions III and IV.

c. 29th General Support Group. Provides Class I, II, III, IV, VII and IX (less aviation, missiles and medical) services and maintenance support, to units located in Military Region III and in Military Region IV to the four northern provinces of Kien Tuong, Ding Tuong, Kien Hoa and Go Cong including US Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces.

d. Delta Logistical Support Activity/48th Transportation Group. Plans for and furnishes supply, service and maintenance support to US Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces located in Military Region IV less the four northern provinces of Kien Tuong, Ding Tuong, Kien Hoa and Go Cong. Included in this mission are the providing of retail Class I, II, III, IV, V, VII and IX supplies and equipment, the providing of direct support maintenance to customers as directed by Saigon Support Command and providing for port clearances, line haul and local haul transportation services in Military Region IV as required within priorities established by MCC.

e. 79th Maintenance Battalion. Provides dedicated support to redeployment of US Forces from RVN by receipt, processing and disposition of material therefrom, and collection, classification and salvage for III and IV Military Regions. Provides

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**Major Subordinate Commands (U)**  
(continued)

limited general support (GS) for Free World Military Assistance Forces and US Forces in Military Regions III and IV. Responsibilities within this mission include the major role in Saigon Support Command's Keystone Program.

f. 3d Ordnance Battalion. Provides Class V support to Military Regions III and IV. The mission includes the operation of a Class V Army Depot and such Ammunition Supply points and forward Support Areas as required in support of Military Regions III and IV.

**COMMAND STRENGTH (C)**

	<b>Officers</b>	<b>Warrant Officers</b>	<b>Enlisted</b>
30 September 1969	795	259	16,220
31 October 1969	832	249	15,477
31 January 1970	769	273	15,091
30 April 1970	697	259	15,240
31 July 1970	595	228	14,542
31 October 1970	668	205	14,650

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**RETROGRADE AND KEYSTONE (C)**

(C) Throughout the year the command was confronted by a challenging military policy which directed the phasedown of United States Army combat and related support forces in Vietnam to include the control and proper disposition of all assets which became available from the phasedown. SSC was tasked with the imposing responsibility for support of this policy for III and IV Military Regions. Retrograde of materiel played a most significant part in activities of the command during the reporting period and occurred while the war effort with its attendant logistical and security requirements continued.

(C) During the early fall of 1969 Operation Keystone Cardinal was initiated. Saigon Support Command was responsible for logistical actions required to redeploy those units located in III and IV Military Regions which were part of the second package. In order to perform this function, personnel from this headquarters and its subordinate units were dispatched to Phu Loi to assist the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the major unit involved. During the fall of 1969, all Keystone Cardinal equipment was accepted, inspected and reported. This involved close coordination between the personnel at: Phu Loi receiving area; the 79th Maintenance Battalion; the 147th Light Maintenance Company; and higher headquarters. The disposition of equipment called for redistribution to units (both US and Free World Forces), return to Depot stock, retrograde, salvage, and out-of-country distribution. Saigon Support Command retrograded 22,000 pieces of equipment from Keystone Cardinal.

(C) After action reports were barely out of the typewriter when planning was in full swing for Keystone Bluejay. Because of the magnitude of this operation, a separate directorate was established with all maintenance personnel associated with Retrograde and Closed Loop activities being physically transferred to the ACofS, Retrograde, on 15 January 1970. Since that time, approximately 92,100 short tons of repairables, 26,200 short tons of Depot Excess and Station returns and 6,520 short tons of ammunition have been retrograded. Close cooperation and mutual assistance continues to be the order of the day. This retrograde operation presented some difficulties. Adequate quantity and capacity of water blasters to properly clean the equipment to meet Department of Agriculture standards, establishment of collecting points for ease of turn-in, security of and accounting for the equipment

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**CONFIDENTIAL****RETROGRADE and KEYSTONE (C)**  
(continued)

while in retrograde locations, and similar problems were encountered. In Operation Keystone Bluejay, SSC was again responsible for all logistical actions required to redeploy supplies and equipment from those units located in III and IV Military Regions which were part of the third reduction in force package. In order to perform this function, personnel from this headquarters and its subordinate units established facilities at Di An and Long Binh to receive equipment of redeploying and inactivating units; redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division and several non-divisional units under Keystone Bluejay was concluded on 6 April 1970. At the conclusion of the operation, 70,000 items had been received from units.

(C) Retrograde of repairable major items was slowed during the period between late February and early March because of more rigid enforcement of Department of Agriculture and US Public Health Service standards. This, in conjunction with Bluejay- temporarily limited the processing of retrograde equipment. Emphasis was placed on the improvement of retrograde procedures. A retrograde inspection team was formed in the Spring of 1970 to instruct and advise SSC units which originated or transported retrograde cargo in the proper packing, marking, documentation, loading, blocking and bracing, and entomological requirements of retrograde cargo. A Retrograde Workshop was conducted in April to review retrograde procedures. Continued drawdown of US troops continued to affect maintenance activities. Keystone Bluejay was officially brought to a close on 6 April, but the equipment left by the departing troops required repair and reissue against valid requirements.

(U) Several maintenance units were attached to the 79th Maintenance Battalion and dedicated exclusively to repair of Keystone assets. In anticipation of the need for some of the more critical items, parts were ordered before the equipment was turned in. Problems associated with identification of these parts were resolved, and the actual flow of repair parts allowed some of the initial equipment to be returned to service. A concentrated program of inspections and requisitioning permitted a reduction of backlog to manageable proportions prior to the next redeployment. Minor problems such as lack of lights to illuminate the Long Binh wash rack, lack of bridge inspectors, and scarcity of repair parts for water blasters were resolved or alleviated. At Newport a six-lane wash rack, 181,000 square yards of paved and crushed rock open storage areas, and 19,000 square yards of paved roads were completed in March, which materially aided staging and processing of retrograde items.

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**RETROGRADE AND KEYSTONE (C)**  
(continued)

(U) On 29 April, Special Criteria for Retrograde of Army Material (SCRAM) Procedures were implemented for all material being evacuated through maintenance channels. SCRAM was originally developed for use in rapid handling of material from redeploying units, and it was used with all normal evacuation procedures. The SCRAM worksheet replaced the DA Form 2404 Technical Inspection formerly required, as well as DA Form 461-5 and DA Form 5-23. Disposition of equipment has been predicated upon a visual inspection, and current Log book entries suffice for supporting paperwork. The procedures worked extremely well for rapid redeployment teams where complete inspections followed the SCRAM classification. The long range problems of inaccuracies in rebuild programs due to missing components and lack of complete technical inspection remain to be resolved.

(C) Progress continued on the Keystone projects, as parts continued to be received and equipment was repaired and returned to stock or released for immediate issue. Preliminary plans were made and trial procedures were tested on the processing line operations to be employed during Keystone Robin. The backlog from previous Keystone projects was reduced, and the majority of equipment processing was completed prior to scheduled receipt of Keystone Robin equipment. Considerable effort was devoted to movement of the equipment to designated repair facilities. Some equipment was evacuated to CONUS, vehicles and weapons were shipped to Okinawa, and hundreds of vehicles were shipped to contractor repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

(C) Operation Keystone Robin Alpha began on 1 July 1970. A retrograde regulation (USASUPCOM, SGN Reg 741-1) was published on 8 July 1970. The Regulation encompasses all previous policies and procedures regarding the identification, classification, preparation, shipment, and reporting of retrograde cargo. On 20 July the processing locations were opened to receive equipment turned in under the Keystone Robin Project. On 21 July a turn-in of excess equipment and supplies on a "no questions asked" basis was initiated for units in SSC.

(C) The retrograde program at Long Binh Depot was accelerated during the first quarter FY71. On 25 September 1970 an all-time retrograde record for Long Binh Depot was set. During the month of September, 5,000 short tons were retrograded. This represented three times the amount of retrograde of any previous month. As of 30 October 1970, 47,000 items of equipment had been processed through Saigon Support Command.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****RETROGRADE AND KEYSTONE (C)**  
(continued)

(C) The units' stand downs and excessive draws of ammunition, in addition to the high quantity of lot suspensions, resulted in over 5,000 short tons of ammunition retrograde accumulating in LBASD. The rapid redeployment and phase out of US military personnel in III and IV Military Regions necessitated an accelerated retrograde program which began in September 1970. The first month of this program over 3,500 short tons of ammunition or 70% of the original total on hand was shipped out of Saigon Support Command. This represented the second highest monthly retrograde shipment in the history of the command. Based on an average cost of ammunition at 97¢ per pound, SSC salvaged approximately \$6,790,000 in one month. In addition to Class V retrograde within the command, we have encouraged supported tactical units to establish proper retrograde and unit turn-ins to preclude unnecessary waste.

(U) Keystone reductions have affected units in SSC. Missions and workloads have been constant or slightly increased while units have experienced inactivation, redeployment or draw down. To plan for future military reductions it became necessary to consider means of mission performance. Two alternatives were developed which would provide for mission accomplishment in consonance with decrease in force structure.

(C) The first was to explore the practicality of employing local nationals in tasks which were being performed by military personnel. Areas in combat service and support skills such as cooks, laundry workers, bakers, drivers, mechanics, dispatchers, key punch operators, equipment operators and supply technicians were found particularly adaptable to local national conversion. Therefore, on 31 July 1970 a plan entitled "Civilianization of Military Spaces" was forwarded to USARV recommending that 3,399 military spaces could be replaced by Local Nationals, provided funds and skills were made available from the local economy.

(C) The second alternative was to maximize the use of civilian contractual services. A study was initiated 23 May 1970 to serve as a guide for formation of services required in FY72. Sixteen areas were identified as being conducive to contractual services of which eight were in USADLB. The remaining areas included Long Binh Logistical Maintenance Activity, Stevedore Service, Tug Boat Service, Port and Beach Clearance and Local Haul, Laundry, Physical Security, Bakery Services and Receipt, Storage and issue of General Supplies, Construction and Major End Items. It was intended that action be initiated to draw down replaced military units to token strength to provide

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**RETROGRADE AND KEYSTONE (C)  
(continued)**

necessary contract supervision where deemed appropriate. Total approval of the plan was expected to result in a savings of 3,100 military spaces; however, due to changes in force structure, redeploying and residual, and budget limitations, the plan has been held in abeyance.

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## CAMBODIAN OPERATION (C)

(U) The thrust of US combat forces into Cambodia was the first multi-divisional Allied offensive during the Vietnamese conflict, and represented a major challenge to Army logisticians.

(U) It was a tribute to the basic logistical structure that standard procedures and existing systems could absorb the additional burden without impairing the normal mission. The Cambodian Operation demonstrated the impressive flexibility of the logistical system in III and IV Military Regions and revealed the high degree of responsiveness which it possessed. It was truly an around the clock operation.

(U) One week prior to the beginning of the Operation, SSC dispatched maintenance personnel to provide technical assistance to tactical units which would be deployed to Cambodia. Technical inspections of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the 5th Infantry Division (ARVN) revealed numerous deficiencies which were corrected, and thereby prevented costly malfunctions in later tactical operations. Two maintenance inspectors also went into Cambodia to provide assistance to the 5th ARVN Division. In addition to providing assistance to ARVN units, we assisted in the maintenance coordination for the movement of the 2/34th Armor and the 2/47th Mechanized Infantry to Cambodia. SSC personnel conducted on-site inspections, made preparations for contact team support, and aided in expediting parts. The production report below in numbers of job orders in the 185th Maintenance Battalion, for the period 15 April to 30 June 1970, is representative of direct support rendered during the Cambodian Operation.

Automotive	1192
Track Vehicles	791
Artillery	213
MHE	176
Engr	72
Power Generation	442
Comml	5756

(U) The task of providing major sub-assemblies and parts for both ARVN and US equipment was a demanding one, and we constantly sought the needed items in all available locations. The most single important measure in supplying tactical units with end items was an ambitious program based upon repair of Keystone assets. After establishing priorities and repair criteria to make Keystone assets available for use in Cambodia, the equipment was returned to use throughout May and June. The following

**CAMBODIAN OPERATION (C)**  
(continued)

table of tracked vehicles used to support the Cambodian Operation over and above equipment already on hand in using units, reveals the magnitude of the task.

Quantity	Type
17	M48A3, Combat Tank
1	Combat Engineer Vehicle
1	M88, Vehicle, Track, Recovery
5	M578, Light Recovery Vehicle
3	M548, Ammunition Carrier
3	M132, Flame Thrower
8	M123, Armored Personnel Carrier
57	M113, Armored Personnel Carrier
18	M113A1, Armored Personnel Carrier
7	M125, Mortar Carrier
2	M110 "8" Howitzer, S.P.
1	M42, Duster
2	AVIB, Brigade Launcher
1	M577A1, Command Vehicle

The effective utilization of Keystone assets insured that tactical operations were not compromised due to a dwindling supply of end items in the field.

(U) On the eve of the Cambodian Operation, this headquarters anticipated an increasing demand for final drives, transmissions, and engines. Closed Loop items were largely furnished from assets on hand, although some items were transhipped from Qui Nhon and Da Nang. Throughout the operation, normal procedures were able to absorb the higher consumption rates. In order to insure that repairable items were returned to the system, this headquarters issued detailed instructions and developed documentation procedures for declaring combat losses. The inability to retrieve certain Closed Loop items produced a mild burden on the system; helicopter support was often unavailable, and although some units did carry unserviceable items with them for later evacuation, some had to be destroyed in place. The following table shows the quantity of Closed Loop Items issued in support of the Cambodian operation:

Quantity	Type
8	M88 Engines
15	M578 Engines
45	M48A3 Final Drives
16	M48A3 Transmissions

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**CAMBODIAN OPERATION (C)**  
(continued)

(U)	Quantity	Type
	25	M48A3 Engines
	102	M113 Engines
	18	D73 Engines
	32	M551 Engines
	30	M551 Transmissions
	9	M158 Gun Mount
	13	M107,M110 Transmissions
	10	M107,M110 Engines
	15	M108,M109 Engines
	20	M37 Recoil Mechanisms
	3	M2A4 Recoil Mechanisms
	2	M6A2 Recoil Mechanisms
	85	M35A2 Engines
	160	M54A2,M52A2,M51A2 Engines
	82	Engine, Military, Standard, 3hp
	112	Engine, Military, Standard, 6hp
	148	Engine, Military, Standard, 10hp
	219	Engine, Military, Standard, 20hp

(C) The myriad of supply transactions gave the system a thorough test, and it was repeatedly found efficient, responsive and rapid. Requests came from II Field Force throughout the day and night, but the response was uniformly rapid. For example, in less than one and one-half hours, from receipt of request, this headquarters processed and shipped a gun-tube to the using unit. It was also necessary to test certain items before sending them to Cambodia to insure that using units would not receive unserviceable equipment. These tests revealed that some bridging materials in Depot stocks were not serviceable, and thus prevented burdening using units with them.

(C) Saigon Support Command supported 85% of the Class V requirements of US Units in Cambodia. To prepare for the operation, our stockage objective was increased from 71,906 short tons (April) to 78,598 short tons (May) and 90,000 short tons (June). My headquarters coordinated the receipt of ammunition from Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang as well as from off-shore locations. During the months of May and June, we received 113,000 short tons of ammunition and issued 114,000 short tons, the second highest issue/receipt activity for any two-month period in FY70. Long Binh Ammunition Depot received more than 2000 short tons daily for four consecutive days, a new record for that installation. Throughout the operation, the two Delta ASPs, Vinh Long and Soc Trang, issued more than twice

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CAMBODIAN OPERATION (C)  
(continued)

as much ammunition than in any previous month of FY70. Air shipments of Class V increased dramatically, and averaged 250 short tons daily throughout May. The highest total tonnage was issued on 1 May, and included 1753.9 short tons by motor transport, 250 short tons by water, 241.2 short tons by air, and 109.3 short tons by unit pickup for a total of 2354.4 short tons. Even when many of the ASPs came under attack in June, Class V support continued unabated.

(U) Terminal operations at Cat Lai and Cogido also reflected that the established structure and procedures of the logistical system enabled it to absorb a major new support requirement of the Cambodian Operation in a responsive and efficient manner. Although the number of ships awaiting discharge increased, the situation was brought under control by adding one Vietnamese stevedore gang to the normal complement of three gangs per ship. In addition to off-loading record tonnage, Cat Lai also processed three Combat Essential missions to the Delta, in spite of the fact that fueling facilities were not available at Vung Tau, and vessels bound for the Delta had to refuel at Nha Be.

(C) As Allied forces uncovered massive enemy supply caches, SSC was tasked to dispose of the captured weapons, ammunition and other materiel. SSC personnel in Cambodia rigged captured materiel for helicopter evacuation, while SSC trucks joined DISCOM assets in bringing the tons of equipment yielded by the caches to initial collection points at Quan Loi and Tay Ninh. A main collection point was established at Di An to display the spectrum of weaponry contained in the sanctuaries. Weapons and associated parts were later moved to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. By the end of the reporting period, the following weapons and ammunition had been delivered to MACV for distribution:

## Weapons

Type	Quantity
7.62mm Assault Rifle, AK47	1676
7.62mm SMG, PPsh41 (Type 50)	364
7.62mm LMG, Type 56, RPD	397
7.62mm HMG, Type 57	59
60mm Mortar	75
82mm Mortar	33
RPG-2 Launcher	639
RPG-7 Launcher	117

**CONFIDENTIAL****CAMBODIAN OPERATION (C)**  
(continued)**Weapons**

Type	Quantity
12.7mm HMG, Type 54	67
75mm RR, Type 56	37
57mm RR	24
7.5mm Rifle, MAS 36	198
7.5mm Auto Rifle	14

**Ammunition**

Type	Quantity (Rounds)
7.62mm LMG	18,480
7.62mm AK	2,462,240
7.62mm HMG	185,680
7.62mm (Pistol & SMG)	238,140
RPG 7	126
RPG 2	2,942
Mine, AT	22
Mine, Directional	4,580
Grenade, AT	1,935
Grenade, Rifle	7,640
14.5mm AA	74,166
120mm Mortar	554
60mm Mortar	3,703
82mm Mortar	4,376
12.7mm HMG	2,133,683
57mm RR	5,590
75mm RR	646
7.5mm (French)	465,320
5.56mm ball (US)	400
12 ga. Shotgun shells (US)	100
Tear gas grenades (US)	20
.30 caliber ball (US)	41,340
81mm HE (US)	2,376
81mm Illum (US)	56

(U) Additional POL requirements were met by establishing temporary facilities at An Long, Chau Doc, and Ha Tien. A barge at Chau Doc was resupplied by returning to Can Tho for refueling, and a second barge at An Long was resupplied by Y-tankers from Nha Be. Although the miniports were continuously being moved, barges were able to navigate the shallow rivers

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CAMBODIAN OPERATION (C)**  
(continued)

and canals to resupply them. The operation at Ha Tien was a unique one. Because the miniport could not be resupplied by road or fixed wing aircraft, we developed a system utilizing vessels and helicopters. A Y-tanker, moored off the coast of Ha Tien, discharged JP-4 into 500 gallon collapsible drums located on an adjacent floating barge. The drums were then moved by helicopter to Ha Tien, and were pumped into 10,000 gallon collapsible storage tanks.

(U) Transportation requirements for the Cambodian incursion placed heavy demands on our assets. Reinforced medium truck platoons were sent to Both Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, and the TMO Operation at each of these points became a miniature movement control center. They were responsible for receiving transportation requests, coordinating convoy security, and supervising the dedicated reinforced medium truck platoons as well as assisting in the offload and turn-around of 48th Group assets. Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, formerly final destinations, became trans-ship points, with SSC trucks moving beyond to Loc Ninh, Bu Dop, Katum, Thien Ngon and into Cambodia. An additional burden was experienced when tactical units utilized their trucks in the rear area and requested SSC transportation support in the forward areas; a practice which impaired the combined support capability.

(U) Virtually all transportation requests were Combat Essential, but unit moves continued to command priority. The nature of the operation altered the cargo mix, and ammunition became the primary commodity for line haul. Although frequently as many as 150 trucks required loading in one night, a tremendous burden on 3d Ordnance Battalion, only one convoy was delayed, but even then without impairment of combat mission. To supplement normal ammunition resupply channels, this command requested an ammunition waiver at Newport to receive Class V trans-shipped from Cam Ranh Bay. When the waiver was refused, the cargo was received at Vung Tau, where, for two five-day periods, thirty trucks of the 48th Transportation Group cleared the cargo and transported it to Long Binh. To meet the extraordinary line haul commitments, port support and local hauls were reduced.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## VIETNAMIZATION/ARVNIZATION (U)

(U) We, in SSC, have been constantly aware of the importance of transferring responsibilities to the ARVN for the long term success of US policy in Vietnam. In Marine and terminal operations, SSC developed and implemented a master plan to integrate ARVN soldiers into every aspect of these operations. Programs of instruction and lesson plans were written to provide complete coverage of each subject area, and personnel were trained to fill highly skilled positions such as those for harbormaster, vessel master, winch operator, marine maintenance specialists, and port and terminal operations officers. Additionally, thorough crew training was implemented to insure cohesive boat operations. This program enabled SSC to turn over the 1097th Medium Boat Company to the ARVN in January 1970. During November, 1969, approximately 130 members of the ARVN 305th Heavy Boat Group were placed aboard the LCUs of the 5th Heavy Boat Company to receive training in the operation and maintenance of these vessels. By the end of January 1970, the ARVNs had taken over most of the boat operation and their level of proficiency indicated they were ready to take over their own vessels. ARVN boat crewmen also began training in the operation of 65 foot tugboats. By March 1970, final preparations were made for the transfer of 4 LCUs to the ARVN. In addition, ARVN crews replaced US crews on 4 US LCUs. These LCUs were utilized to handle both US and ARVN commitments and remained under my operational control.

(U) On 28 August 1970, the POL Supply Point and miniport operation at Tay Ninh were officially transferred to ARVN. This action climaxed a rather lengthy and complex period of combined planning marked by several instances of a lack of effective coordination and communication with ARVN counterparts. Due to the continued efforts of SSC personnel in coordination with ARVN Advisory personnel at the operating level and in consonance with existing directives governing such transfer actions, the complete turnover was effected in a timely manner. The transfer of the POL mission to ARVN at Quan Loi was off to an abortive start when US units transferred the POL operation without proper authority. As a result, many of the problems experienced in the Tay Ninh planning were also experienced in the Quan Loi transfer procedures. II Field Force put US personnel back into Quan Loi to operate the POL facility with ARVN remaining on an OJT status. SSC initiated actions necessary to get the original plans for transfer approved by both MACV and ARVN. In the interim, SSC wrote a proposal to USARV governing the effective



VIETNAMIZATION/ARVNIZATION (U)

control and accounting for fuels for refueling US forces remaining as tenants. The POL facility at Soc Trang was scheduled for turnover to VNAF in October; however, in the absence of the LOI from JGS, the property was hand receipted and the POL transferred as an issue to VNAF.

(U) During the period 1 December 1969 to 1 November 1970, four (4) Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) have been returned to VNAF. Lai Khe ASP was turned over to ARVN personnel on 21 February 1970. On 31 July 1970, Tay Ninh ASP was turned over to ARVN. On 15 October, Soc Trang ASP was made a co-located ASP for the US Army - Vietnamese Air Force. At the Soc Trang ASP, US and VNAF personnel jointly operate a single Class V storage facility for aerial support of ARVN Infantry in the southeastern part of IV Military Region. In May 1970, the ARVN Binh Thuy Depot began issuing Class V to US Units in the Binh Thuy - Can Tho area. This operation is entirely ARVN controlled except that the US provides transportation of bulk Class V to the Depot.

(U) Additionally, Quan Loi ASP was phased out on 10 September 1970 to accommodate the arrival of an ARVN Infantry Unit into the Quan Loi base camp. At present there is no indication that ARVN plans to utilize the ASP.

(U) On 29 April 1970, Camp Davies in Saigon was transferred to VNAF. The M and M Pier area of Saigon Port Complex was transferred to ARVN control on 24 June 1970 with the stipulation that if the military situation warranted, the US could assume control of port operations.

(U) At Long Binh Depot Vietnamese Nationals have been utilized extensively in Stock Control, Storage and Data Systems. During January 1970, we began an intensive OJT Program for Local Nationals in the Stock Control Division. Vietnamese are now being utilized as editors and clerks in all commodities, while the Red Ball Requisition Section is now completely Vietnamized. Vietnamese have been trained in storage operations and are being employed as warehousemen and forklift operators. In April 1970, a training program in storage operations was started for Local Nationals with Phase I of the program directed at the supervisory level and Phase II for non-supervisory personnel. A training program for Vietnamese in Data Processing was started in January 1970 and as a result three computer operators and three programmer positions have been filled with Vietnamese. In addition, 13 Vietnamese are now employed in positions such as key punch operators to tape librarians.

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VIETNAMIZATION/ARVNIZATION (U)  
(continued)

(U) The training of ARVN soldiers has been accomplished by two very successful methods: Instruct and Advise Teams, and BUDDY training. An Instruct and Advise Team composed of six highly skilled individuals was formed in September 1969 to provide technical assistance to ARVN. The following specialties:

- a. Track oriented mechanical maintenance supervisor
- b. Senior supply sergeant
- c. Armament maintenance specialist
- d. Metal working foreman
- e. Fuel and electrical systems repairman
- f. Recovery specialist/wrecker operator

(U) The Instruct and Advise Team provides technical assistance to ARVN Ordnance Direct Support Units in Military Regions III and IV, and normally remains with a unit for six weeks using the ARVN facilities, tools and supplies. The team is under operational control of MACV. A complete list of units visited by the Instruct and Advise Team since September 1969 is at Inclosure 18.

(U) The "BUDDY" Program has been and continues to be a very successful program for the training of ARVN soldiers. The method of training ARVN is essentially on-the-job training, as the Instruct and Advise Team is, but is conducted at US Units. The ARVN trainees live, sleep and work side-by-side with their US counterparts. On-the-job training permits "show-how" and "hands-on-the-equipment" techniques which minimize the language barrier. A list including Instruct and Advise Team and BUDDY training since 1 October 1969 is at Inclosure 19.

SECURITY (U)

(U) The Key and Critical Fixed Logistical Installations of this command offer some of the most lucrative targets for enemy action in South Vietnam. We have directed continuous effort toward improving our primary and secondary defensive perimeters and avoiding the establishment of fatal operating patterns. Vulnerability of Fixed Installations has been reduced by employment of carefully prepared barriers and application of essential tactical doctrines of proper observation and fields of fire. Every capability of the Tactical Elements in the area has been exploited; to include aggressive patrolling, ambushes and employment of aerial and ground sensors.

(U) Our movement of supplies and equipment along the waterways and roads of III and IV Military Regions offers the enemy opportunities for significant impact on Free World Force capabilities. The essential nature and often immediate need for our resupply activities does not preclude adequate preparation. Coordination for fire support and reaction forces has been completed for all resupply movements. To conserve our assets for logistical support we have utilized the organic security forces of the supported tactical units who have cooperated in an outstanding manner.

(U) It appears that the actions we have taken, together with supporting units, have been effective as a deterrent during the reporting period. However, there is always room for improvement of security measures in procedures, facilities, equipment, communication and training. Such is the case in SSC. With the decrease in combat operations and the tendency toward complacency and inattention, there is an ever-increasing requirement for close, effective supervision, continuing upgrading of measures and increased vigilance and alertness to a possible change in the enemy tactics toward our installations.



## TRANSPORTATION (U)

(U) Reorganization for improved mission efficiency was the Command's policy for transportation assets during the year. Apart from the already discussed role of transportation in the Cambodian operation, SSC planned, coordinated and monitored the employment of assigned transportation means for the movement of personnel and cargo throughout III and IV Military Regions.

(U) Significant new missions arose for our transportation assets as a result of Cambodia and Retrograde activities under Keystone Cardinal, Bluejay and Robin. The 4th Transportation Command vehicles committed to line haul resupply missions were utilized for return shipment of retrograde cargo from outlying areas to the collection, classification and salvage points located at Long Binh. LCUs and LCMs, returning from missions backloaded retrograde cargo from Delta ports to Newport. Similarly SSC designated 4th Transportation Command convoys committed to special missions to the Delta and convoys from Binh Thuy to bring retrograde cargo to the processing points at Long Binh.

(U) Mission improvement was essential for the command in such a year of change. Decisions of high priority were necessary. Thus, I decided to deactivate the Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group and to integrate the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions (Motor Transport) into the 4th Transportation Command. This was done on 6 August 1970. The decision enabled all assigned transportation assets to be controlled directly and operated by one command, with the exception of limited highway and port clearance assets under the control of the Delta Logistical Support Activity (DLSA).

(U) Throughout the year, SSC met new records in transportation operations. On 24 May 1970, 2,702 short tons of ammunition were discharged at Cogido, surpassing the old record of 2,563 short tons, while one month later, 11,280 short tons of cargo were discharged at the US Army Terminal, Newport. The old record was 10,869 short tons. In July, 1970, Newport again set records as 155,187 short tons of cargo were discharged, far above the previous high mark of 132,190 short tons.

(U) In the Delta itself, improved control of the water traffic was another goal of SSC. This was finalized in September 1970 with the organization of a committee consisting of representatives of the 3d Transportation Center (Movements Control), MACV-Traffic Management Agency, Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) and the Military Sealift Command Office, Vietnam. This committee manages water traffic into Can Tho and other Delta ports.

**TRANSPORTATION (U)**  
**(continued)**

**(U) The rapid and sweeping changes in force structure and resultant changes in the supply distribution system dictate a review of the US transportation structure in RVN. At Inclosure 22 is a transportation concept which may under certain conditions prove feasible.**

## MAINTENANCE SUPPORT (U)

(U) The criticality of the M109 Howitzer and the M107 SP Gun/M110 SP Howitzer demanded the development of a comprehensive and responsive maintenance program. To achieve this a revitalized Repair and Return Program was established during October 1969. This program made it necessary for a direct support team and the gun crew to work together on-site to repair defective components. Initially, the Repair and Return Program was hampered by the nonavailability of and excessive order and ship time for required repair parts. On numerous occasions, repairs were delayed or rescheduled because of lack of essential parts. This problem was alleviated by performing inspections on vehicle candidates six weeks and two weeks in advance of the R&R scheduled date.

(U) The largest single customer in terms of workload both in volume and complexity, was the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. This unit had no organic direct support maintenance capability. By the very nature of its structure and its tactical deployment in many, and changing, dislocated areas this unit presented a unique challenge. The area maintenance concept could not be applied economically because each DSU would have to have a capability in terms of peculiar parts and skills to support the unit when it moved into each area. The solution adopted was to provide priority support initially from the 185th Maintenance Battalion and subsequently dedicated support by the 135th Lgh Maintenance Company (augmented) of that battalion. The long term requirement should be met by an attached tailored maintenance unit or a composit support unit to include the maintenance.

(U) A revitalized program for support in the Delta was initiated during the reporting period. Since service to units is handicapped by limited transportation in the Delta, a maintenance collecting point was established to facilitate turn-in of unserviceable equipment in local areas. The maintenance unit assumed the responsibility for returning this equipment to the established evacuation points with an attempted consolidation of transportation requirements. This eased the burden on customers throughout the Delta. Activation of the Delta Logistical Support Activity, directly subordinate to my headquarters, was accomplished on 20 April 1970. Direct communication with the maintenance units in the Delta has proved beneficial and provided more responsive support to customers in IV Military Region.

(U) In an effort to provide better support for customer needs, a realignment of missions was planned which provided that all Direct Support Maintenance units be placed in the 29th General

**MAINTENANCE SUPPORT (U)**  
**(continued)**

Support Group, and all General Support Maintenance units report directly to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. Unit realignment was delayed until 1 April, to insure that all customers were fully informed of the support change and no degradation of any support resulted. The basic plan was sound, but was modified by the necessity to dedicate the GS capability to Keystone and retrograde activities. The shift allowed realignment of maintenance supply activities, with a more equitable distribution of workload. It appears that additional DS Maintenance effort may have to be diverted to purely retrograde for the preparation of equipment for out-shipment.



## TRAINING (U)

(U) The mission of our training program has been to establish policies and provide guidance for all echelons of the command in planning, conducting and supervising the military training of individuals and units assigned or attached to the US Army Support Command, Saigon. This program has been both active and aggressive in obtaining its stated goals. The following guidelines were established to insure the success of the program.

a. To develop squads, sections, contact teams, platoons, detachments and companies into effective teams capable of performing operational missions.

b. To improve technical proficiency through on-the-job training.

c. To develop high standards of performance through increased technical knowledge related to job requirements and emphasis on military discipline, health and physical fitness.

d. To develop basic combat proficiency in all individuals and integrate these individuals into teams capable of effective defense of logistic installations, activities or unit areas.

e. To develop a capability at all echelons of command to impart basic and advanced skills to Local Nationals.

(U) Because the majority of the training of military personnel sent to Vietnam takes place in the CONUS base, the training program within SSC has focused on the goal of training as many individuals as have been needed to accomplish the mission. Coupled with the character of the conflict in Vietnam, imagination and a professional understanding of the task at hand have been essential. The average monthly number of courses and MOS combined since September 1969 is 104. The average monthly number of individuals trained in either formal classroom training, on-the-job training or a combination of both, for the same period is 1750. Key courses included refrigeration, air conditioning, radar, turret, powertrain and track vehicle repairman and engine diagnostic training utilizing AMC field technicians to train trainers.

(U) With the increased tempo of redeployment has brought transferees from redeploying units, curtailment of tours and frustration and diversion of personnel from the pipeline. As a result the program has taken on new importance in assuring a capability to perform the assigned mission and secure the logistical activities of the command.

PERSONNEL RELATED SERVICES (U)

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(U) During the reporting period, a Non-Appropriated Fund Branch was formed to administer and advise all nonappropriated funds of the Command. An Inspection and Assistance team which inspected open mess systems and other Sundry Funds on a quarterly basis has proved a great benefit to all custodians of OSF and open messes in improving internal controls and organization. An NAF Review Council was also formed to meet on a monthly basis to review financial statements and minutes of open mess systems. Constructive criticism was forwarded to each system for corrective action. The Council has identified problem areas overlooked by custodians and Board of Governors. The NAF Branch became responsible for the approval of the sixty Domestic Hire Funds under SSC which are periodically inspected.

(U) During the past year, 6,246 mandays were donated for civic action from units within SSC. The total expenditures for Civic Action from Saigon Support Command include:

a. Material donated from military resources 10,358,333 \$VN (87,782 \$US).

b. Monies from the PSYWAR Fund 1,165,440 \$VN (9,960 \$US).

c. Voluntary contribution of 533,856 \$VN (4,524 \$US). Command emphasis at all echelons has been outstanding. This has resulted in an excellent overall attitude toward the civil affairs program. Without the cooperation which has been received from the subordinate units, the program could not have enjoyed such resounding success.

(U) During this period, my Civil Military Operations Division assumed an indirect role in the Cambodian operation by supporting Vietnamese refugees who have been displaced from Cambodia. Scrap lumber from PDO and dunnage from the Newport Dunnage Yard have been supplied to the Refugee Center near Vung Tau and the two Refugee Centers near Xuan Loc. When the Refugee Center Assistance Project is completed, approximately 28,000 refugees will have been provided support.

(U) The GMO Division has participated in the Vietnamization Program through selectivity of civic action projects. Any project undertaken must have GVN approval and be a requirement that cannot be met by the GVN itself. Projects undertaken are primarily self-help projects in which the Vietnamese provide the labor required and a portion of the materiel. SSC provides only material and technical advice not available to the Vietnamese. Two excellent examples of these projects include the High School under construction at Niep Hoa Island

PERSONNEL RELATED SERVICES (U)  
(continued)

and homes for twenty widows and their families at the 3d ARVN Ranger Compound in Ho Nai. During the past year, approximately 200 civic action and community relations projects have been completed in the field of economic development, education, social welfare, transportation, and refugee assistance support.

(U) Saigon Support Command in coordination with the 24th Evacuation Hospital instituted a medical civic action program (MEDCAP) for the Long Binh area. Physical sickness has been the central focus of this effort, but it has also enhanced greater understanding between the two nations.

(U) During the past year we have initiated several important Safety Programs. One has been the establishment of the SSC Safety Patrol. Full time patrol activities with two qualified MPs manning the vehicle were initiated 14 September 1970. The patrol observes and reports on safety violations and renders assistance to anyone in trouble along their patrol route. In its short period of operation the patrol has met with much success and its warnings to drivers have been accepted in a cooperative spirit.

(U) Effective 1 February 1970 a safety rating program was established for all drivers of passenger carrying vehicles assigned to the Transportation Motor Pool. Through the use of a safety rating card drivers are constantly screened and rated for their driving ability by persons who watch them drive, thus providing prompt distinction between good and poor drivers. Defensive Driving classes for instructors were established at SSC and classes conducted during December 1969 and January 1970. Forty (40) instructors were certified during this period and will in turn teach Defensive Driving to members of their respective units.



## COMPTROLLER FUNCTIONS (U)

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(U) In October 1969, the Saigon Support Command Contract Performance Review Board was established. The purpose of the board is to provide me with a timely and thorough examination of contract performance within SSC. This board provides a basis for performance evaluation and revalidation of contractual requirements. It also supports recommendations for continuance, expansion or curtailment of contractual services. The board is made up of key staff members and since its inception has assisted in the monitorship of over one hundred contracts valued in excess of \$70,000,000. The FY 71 contracts are shown at Inclosure 21.

(U) In December 1969 a Cost Reduction Program entitled "Project 100 Million" was initiated by the First Logistical Command. During this Cost Reduction Program, SSC contributed eighty-seven actions or fifty-four percent of the total actions submitted in the entire "Project 100 Million". Twenty-seven million dollars savings resulted from these intensified management actions.

(U) In July 1970, Saigon Support Command assumed the additional mission of reimbursing Imprest Fund Cashiers and Kit Carson Scouts for the Assistance-In-Kind Custodian located in Saigon. Previous to this time, the cashiers and scouts traveled to USARV - Budget Division for verification of reimbursement vouchers and then traveled to Saigon for the actual reimbursement. Now, both the verification and reimbursement are consolidated in one transaction thus eliminating unnecessary travel by Imprest Fund Cashiers and Kit Carson Scouts. SSC designed the entire accounting system for the Class B Agent who thus far has disbursed over \$206 million piasters without any changes to the original plans or the system.

(U) The automated supply system under which Vietnam had been operating was the Standard Supply System for Vietnam (3SVN). This system was approximately equivalent to Version 21 of the Standard Supply System (3S), but had been modified by local requirements. At the end of August 1970, Long Binh De ot (ICCV and all other Vietnam Depots) converted to Version 32, 3S, under which USARPAC was operating. The concept is to have the Pacific operating under a homogeneous system, i.e., 3S.

(U) A major effort emerged, during the past year to reorganize and consolidate the finance offices under the operational control of my headquarters. The goal emerged as a significant management action to combine personnel and assets as a result

COMPTROLLER FUNCTIONS (U)  
(continued)

of reductions in troop strength. As a result of these efforts four finance offices closed and the headquarters elements of two finance sections merged with the largest of their Class B Offices. In March 1970, the 22d Finance Section (Disb) moved from Nha Trang to Di An to fill the gap in services created by the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. The finance section was assigned to this headquarters and assumed financial services for non-divisional elements supported by the 1st Infantry Division. Services were initiated in time to meet the support requirements caused by the Cambodian Operation. The three finance sections, (7th, 22d and 292d) provided finance services to 51,000 troops assigned to non-divisional units in the III and IV Military Regions. Similarly, financial service was provided to 16,000 Local National Civilian Employees.

INSPECTOR GENERAL  
UTILIZATION (U)

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(U) Maximum utilization of the Command's Inspector General has enabled us to establish and operate an effective system for the receipt of complaints, correcting injustices affecting system for the receipt of complaints, correcting injustices affecting individuals and for eliminating conditions detrimental to the efficiency of this command. The Inspector General conducted 113 inspection units from September 1969 to September 1970. Of the units inspected, 104 received a Satisfactory rating and nine received an Unsatisfactory rating. The 92% Satisfactory rating reflected favorably on the command and its emphasis on disciplined and economical leadership.

(U) During this same period, the Inspector General's office received a total of 787 complaints and requests for assistance; 71 justified complaints, 212 unjustified complaints, and 504 requests for assistance. Complaints and requests for assistance have demonstrated a gradual increase which is expected to continue as the drawdown of forces progresses. Evaluation of complaints, by unit, has indicated areas where communications are lacking. I have taken appropriate command action to assure recognition and correction of these communication problems.

## REFLECTIONS

In this portion of the report, I will highlight those subjects which I feel are important, under the headings of Observations, Lessons Learned and Problems. While I have so categorized them, I find it difficult to discern in some cases which is which. I respectfully invite the reader to either make his own division or disregard since the substance is of the essence. For specifics and additional items such as these, and more, I recommend the bibliography at Inclosure 23.

## OBSERVATIONS

First, I feel that basically the supply, maintenance, transportation and field services procedures are sound and that generally the personnel who execute them, on the whole, should be commended for a valiant attempt to provide un-faulting support. There have been "goofs", some large, some small - but none disastrous and all human.

I have found that successful management at the Support Command level requires that one view the logistical support as a series of systems some of which are interdependent - some independent. It was difficult to gain acceptance of this in distribution systems, such as ammunition, with elements involved, initially and directly, from three subordinate commands supported by two more. Management indicators must be geared to permit control of contributing elements such as ship to barge discharge rate, barge to truck discharge limits and truck to Depot pad capabilities. Even with functionalization, few efforts in the wholesale to retail distribution, maintenance or services are done by one subordinate element.

Most of the systems have been established, documented, tried, retried and proved. The difficulty has been in getting each of us at each level to accept that there is an SOP and follow it. I have never felt that the rotation policy or partial lack of skills was a serious problem. To the contrary, the rotation policy is a plus because the individual knows when he is going home and can work toward that if properly motivated. The key is to provide the SOP wherewithal and, most important, the motivation to do well thereby making the individual, and therefore the system, gainfully productive. Our systems have been tried and proven sound by the Cambodian Operation, Keystone, Labor strikes, etc. They are, however, subject to change in the face of redeployment and must continually be updated.



OBSERVATIONS (continued)

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Under the nebulous category of attitudes I have observed many facets, most of which can be summarized under the heading of personal or individual responsibility or lack thereof. Each of us, regardless of rank, MOS or position has a basic responsibility to conform to prescribed and acceptable standards. The degree of conformance and the tolerance of standards, be it performance or discipline, are a function of the degree of acceptance of the personal responsibility and almost directly the degree to which supervision at each level employs effectively and efficiently knowledge, experience, rapport, motivation and follow-up. I have found that most of the problems encountered in my command stem from failure on the part of supervision at all levels to employ all the ingredients and particularly the latter three; rapport, motivation and follow-up. There appears to be adequate professionalism in terms of knowledge and experience in what should be done, how, when, etc., but, there is a glaring deficiency in professionalism of communicating and follow-up in various units at various times. Since this is a function of personalities, the deficiency in a given unit relates directly to the personnel rotation. Part of the problem of communicating the motivation stems from age, education and experience stratification within most of the support units. Young, educated, aggressive company officers, mostly obligatory tour, and from the post WWII permissive society, supervising "lifers" of 10-25 years service who have been schooled in "do or die, not to reason why" and, who are supervising young, educated and aggressive enlisted men who like to know why. Generation or communications gap are names sometimes applied and I think realistically. I believe it is the most important leadership responsibility of senior officers and NCOs thru their respective channels of command, staff and informally official (CSM to CSM to 1st Sergeant, etc.) to bridge this gap. It can be done, it must be done through willingness to listen, act and react properly to the communication of problems either real or imagined.

There is ample evidence of the lack of this personal responsibility in the failure to challenge the obvious omission or commission, acceptance of status quo, or "look the other way" approach. This evidence manifests itself in several obvious ways such as: commanders and other supervisors being surprised at what is found or being omitted or committed in his area of responsibility when discovered by a visiting senior officer; ignoring obvious adverse indicators; failure to provide adequate personnel facilities; procedures, equipment and training for tactical and physical security; failure to perform appropriate orientation; inspections and

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**OBSERVATIONS (continued)**

disciplinary action in connection with drugs, unauthorized weapons and other serious violations of regulations; lack of sense of urgency in getting on with the job and in meeting and assisting customers; and lack of a positive attitude.

There is hope, however, because these deficiencies are not prevalent in all units nor are all of them in any one unit. More importantly, most of our personnel are well intentioned, dedicated and hard charging doers. While I have devoted much effort to instilling "care" in the command, I feel that much needs to be done at every echelon to assure that each individual is motivated to "chew his part of the elephant".

One of the few efforts countering the Ugly American is the Civic Action Program. I have had much personal satisfaction from witnessing the harmonious relationships and good will established and the genuine pleasure and admiration shown by the Vietnamese recipients for those few who have worked in the program. This is a program worth fullest command support to the extent resources will permit.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

Keystone. Lessons learned in each project are included in reports listed at Inclosure 23.

a. The late release of "close-hold" data on units in each redeployment package presents problems at the support command and lower levels in preparation for receipt of material, liaison with involved units, frustration and diversion of supplies and other necessary actions. While earliest feasible release from "close hold" is essential, much can be done in advance of announcements.

b. Reducing inventories, and non-mission essential equipment is a must for all USARV units to assure ability to move if nominated for Keystone or ability to be properly and economically supported if retained.

c. Organizational Maintenance should be kept up at all times but command emphasis is mandatory upon notification of redeployment.

d. Free turn in is effective but requires command emphasis and control to assure care and security of property.

## LESSONS LEARNED (continued)

e. Post Camp and Station Property Disposition must be determined in advance of stand downs, and all recipients geared to move it as it becomes available.

f. SCRAM procedures are effective and efficient in a rapid processing of Keystone materiel. While a problem may exist in relating rebuild, pre-inspection criteria to SCRAM, the latter simplified procedure is necessary to permit flow of vast quantities of retrograde materiel.

Customer Assistance from both supply and maintenance DSUs and depots is a must if the supply system is to be capable of and given the opportunity to provide adequate support. The lack of understanding of or failure to adhere to prescribed PLL procedures, requisitioning, processing and supply accounting has contributed to the instances of zero balances or deadline rates. Continued emphasis must be maintained on a complete program of customer assistance at all levels. If a customer thinks he has a problem, he has one until the support element assists in solving it or proves it to be imaginary.

Low density, high usage, critical combat major items require intensive management in terms of repair parts, and maintenance support. The M551, Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle is an example of an item for which this was done by designating a key depot for parts peculiar to the system and by consolidating support maintenance to the extent feasible, in view of areas of operations, units supported and support maintenance capability. As redeployment continues further consolidation and functionalizations will be made.

Property disposal, always fraught with potential problems of collusion and mismanagement, has developed into a large complex operation because of the policy to "clean the battlefield". Understandably there was a rapid and relatively disorganized accumulation of property in the early days of the build up until the Keystone era. Fortunately, this was recognized during the early Keystone phase by CG, 1st Logistical Command and the trend reversed in terms of organizing staffing and equipping the PDO operations to include new innovations and expedited contract arrangements for sale and removal. This new approach has taken hold and favorable trends are developing in the Long Binh PDO. The requirements for appropriate property disposal effort must be recognized and met in early stages of operations.



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### LESSONS LEARNED (continued)

Organizational structures in the subordinate commands change as rapidly as the weather as a result of mission changes, redeployment and individual commanders' desires. As a result instances occurred wherein resultant units were too large, too dislocated or too dissimilar in functions of subordinate elements to be efficiently manageable. For example, the 29th General Support Group had in August 1969, the direct support mission for III and IV MR and consisted of nine battalions equivalents and almost 8,000 personnel. During the reporting period through various actions this group has been trimmed to five generally smaller battalions with about 4,000 personnel and the mission of supporting III MR and four northern provinces in IV MR. A separate Delta Logistical Activity, reporting directly to SSC, was established to support the remainder of the Delta. This is but one of several examples of key organizational changes that took place during the reporting period but it indicates the necessity for continuous review of structure and missions to preclude imbalances in supervision, workload and span of control and improper or inefficient application of resources.

### PROBLEM

Future support to MACV Advisory and other non-USARV elements poses problems for the planners of the future USARV force structure. At some point in time, either the MACV Advisory structure must include a support element for each Military Region or USARV elements will have to be retained for this purpose. I am aware of efforts at III MR Senior Advisor level to design and obtain approval of such an element. This should be pursued in all MRs.

It is obvious, even in the face of national policy to get US forces out of RVN that there is resistance to change. This is born out in the reluctance to release personnel, supplies and equipment which are not required. This shows up in practically all support units. It has been difficult to change the philosophy from having "all you need and then some" to "lean and mean" so that the unit can manage its resources, therefore perform better and redeploy or deactivate as necessary. Command must continue to impress upon all elements at all levels that we can reduce workload by reducing personnel, supplies and equipment thereby reducing the same resources required to support the original resources, and so on.

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**PROBLEMS (U)**  
(continued)

(C) The MOOSE (Move Out of Saigon Expeditiously) and GOOSE (Get Out....) Projects were supported to the fullest possible extent by SSC Units. However, the expected migration or drawdown of customer units has not materialized requiring the remaining units to draw subsistence and consumable general supplies from either Long Binh or Di An, primarily the latter. This forces many small units to travel the congested Routes 1 and 316 on a frequent basis which increases accident exposure and expense of operation. With further drawdown of units, most customers in the Saigon area will be obtaining supplies from Long Binh therefore overloading those facilities. An evaluation should be made of what customers are to remain in Saigon and determine if it is appropriate to establish a minimum Class I Point and self service supply center at Tan Son Nhut.

(U) Security of critical logistical facilities in the face of drawdown presents a problem to be studied. Several of the key US facilities in the III and IV MRs will be retained for extended periods even though the units to operate those facilities will be drawn down. Alternative means of tactical and physical security must be sought. Of particular concern are the ports, POL and ammo facilities.

(U) The time required to effect Keystone turnovers to ARVN of TOE type equipment, fixed facilities and supplies (POL) related to base turnover is inordinately long. The "Close hold" procedure, because it involves mostly planners, dictates that little can be done to effect transfers until official Keystone announcement is made. By that time it is too late to wade through the procedures and still accomplish the job efficiently. A joint-allied planning and operating group should be established as a clearing house for expediting decisions and actions on turn over matters.

(C) The failure to redeploy all US units from bases being turned over to ARVN is piecemealing the assets of SSC. Bases such as Dong Tam, Tay Ninh, Quan Loi, Lai Khe, various fire bases and to some extent, Vung Tau, were at one time closed insofar as presence of SSC units. Either through US units returning to these bases or those there not being able to provide proper resources to support themselves, or both, SSC has been tasked to return. Granted, these are small teams, but with few bases fully closing, this will become critical during the drawdown.

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**PROBLEM (U)**  
(continued)

(U) The ARVNization of significant US systems, such as Cat Lai - Cogido ammunition, presents a problem which needs further review, direction and action. Although only pursued on an informal basis, I was unable to arouse much interest with my Vietnamese counterpart, CO, III ALC in the assumption of this or similar facilities. While this is a longer range problem, it must be faced now in view of US drawdown.

(U) Port facilities at Cat Lai and Binh Thuy require action. If, in the long term, containerized ammunition is to be put through Cat Lai a deep draft pier in that general area should be constructed. The value of containerization will be lost on a ship-to-barge discharge whereas ship-to-chassis-to-thru-put-to-consumer will maximize container shipment economy. The ARVN operated port of Binh Thuy must receive engineer effort at the earliest practical date. The lack of stabilization of the beaches and roads inhibits discharge and clearance to the extent that alternate and less economical means of transport must be used to provide required support.

(U) The stock levels in DSUs, both supply and maintenance have historically been high both in terms of number of lines and quantities. This has proven to be difficult to manage and was complicated by the desire to excel by each new DSU commander (each 6 months) to rewarehousing, inventorying, locating and so on without getting to the basic question of retrograding excesses. The DSU excess programs and new stockage criteria are working to solve this problem but require constant supervision to assure no reversal of trend in those remaining units.

(U) The lack of timely and effective requisition reconciliations between customer and DSU and DSU and depot have caused much adverse criticism of the supply system which in effect was primarily human error. Reconciliations as recent as October and November 1970 revealed significant percentages of invalid dues in and dues out. A firm, timely and accurate reconciliation program is a necessity as well as continuous education and motivation of stock record clerks to preclude poor supply support or excess stocks.

(U) The combat serviceable condition code C jungle fatigues are continuing to accumulate in the Long Binh Depot at a rate faster than issue. A program for issuing them to incoming personnel should be established. Personnel departing US for RVN could be issued three sets of condition code A uniforms prior to departure and two sets of condition code C uniforms upon arrival in country.

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**PROBLEM (U)**  
(continued)

(U) Demolition and retrograde of unserviceable ammunition increased appreciably during the initial phases of redeployment. Units had readied more ammunition than they could consume and packaging material and boxes had been diverted to other uses. While this situation appears to be in hand, it requires constant surveillance and command emphasis to assure compliance with good supply discipline and safety regulations.

(U) Lack of organizational maintenance and maintenance management plagued many supported units as well as SSC units. The blame belongs equally with the customer unit, in lack of command emphasis, inadequate scheduled maintenance and improper management of PLLs, and in the DSUs with lack of customer assistance and proper supply support. Again, the system was not at fault but only the people operating it. This system requires more and constant supervision and enforcement in the face of decreasing resources.

(C) The wide dispersion of artillery and cross attachments of different weapons presents some unique support maintenance problems. Most of the heavy artillery is still deployed out beyond the bases from which SSC elements have redeployed. This necessitates either going back into "closed" bases as contact team base camps or operating from the rear. The latter presupposes dedicated cargo and personnel airlift which is the only means available for access to some customers and which heretofore has not been available. This will be further complicated if SSC maintenance units draw down faster than artillery units and if SSC assumes additional areas of operation for artillery support.

(U) Tabular authorization is required to maintain an effective replacement program in the fast turnover in RVN. The procedures for obtaining required authorization in support of a valid mission are cumbersome and lengthy therefore lead to diversion of or subterfuge in accounting for personnel or both. The theatre commander should have extensive latitude to permit adjustments acquired to fit the environment.

(U) Contracting Officers representatives and Ordering Officers with rare exception, have not been authorized TOE or TD yet are mandatory. Many of these jobs are full time jobs if done properly. While the strengths and authorizations in the past have permitted covering these necessary functions provisions should be made for them under reduced authorizations following redeployment.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****PROBLEM (U)**  
(continued)

(U) The effect of Contractor work stoppages in the past have been negated but may present problems in the future when US support and combat forces are not available in sufficient numbers to implement current work stoppage plans. I recommend frequent review of work stoppage plans in light of current resources and potential workloads.

(U) The contractor operated tire retread plant at Long Binh has presented problems in start up and during operation. With the recent receipt of additional equipment and plant improvements, the potential is available to fulfill the contract requirement and reduce cost by minimizing number of new tires through the supply system. The performance should be monitored carefully.


(C) Operation Compassion has moved slowly due to nonavailability of combat elements to secure graves registration recovery teams. While this is understandable, two factors dictate early review and decision on the future of this project. Firstly, the draw down of combat forces further decreases the potential availability. Secondly, if and when enemy held prisoner of war lists are released there will be a loud clamor for effort to recover the remains of those unlisted.

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# III MR MAJOR ROAD NET & AIRFIELDS



COMPILED BY 517 THER DET (THER)  
 BASED ON DATA AND INFORMATION RECEIVED  
 FROM THE MR AND AM  
 DURING THE PERIOD OF 1-1-68 TO 31-12-68

## ROAD CLASSIFICATIONS

CUSTOM STANDARD ROAD

CLASS II ROAD

CLASS III ROAD

CLASS I ROAD

STATUS OF ROAD NOT

KNOWN OR CLOSED

INTERNAL ROUTE

INTERPROVINCIAL ROUTE

PROVINCIAL ROUTE

SUPPLEMENTARY ROUTE

COMMERCIAL ROUTE

## AIRFIELDS

ABANDONED

CLOSED

OPEN

C-130

C-119

C-7A

OTHER AIRFIELD

MAJOR AIRFIELD

ON MAPS WITH ROAD NETWORKS, AIRFIELD

ARE SHOWN WITH THE ROAD NETWORK

## OTHER FEATURES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

PROVINCE BOUNDARY

PROVINCE NAME

RAILROAD

COAST LINE FOR BACTY LOC

For details of symbols on this map, see  
 the legend on the back of the map.  
 Symbols are shown in the legend in the  
 order in which they are used on the map.

Inclosure 1

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W. J. C.

**Notes**

1. The following information was obtained from the records of the FBI, New York City, dated 1/15/68, and 1/16/68, and 1/17/68, and 1/18/68, and 1/19/68, and 1/20/68, and 1/21/68, and 1/22/68, and 1/23/68, and 1/24/68, and 1/25/68, and 1/26/68, and 1/27/68, and 1/28/68, and 1/29/68, and 1/30/68, and 1/31/68, and 2/1/68, and 2/2/68, and 2/3/68, and 2/4/68, and 2/5/68, and 2/6/68, and 2/7/68, and 2/8/68, and 2/9/68, and 2/10/68, and 2/11/68, and 2/12/68, and 2/13/68, and 2/14/68, and 2/15/68, and 2/16/68, and 2/17/68, and 2/18/68, and 2/19/68, and 2/20/68, and 2/21/68, and 2/22/68, and 2/23/68, and 2/24/68, and 2/25/68, and 2/26/68, and 2/27/68, and 2/28/68, and 2/29/68, and 2/30/68, and 3/1/68, and 3/2/68, and 3/3/68, and 3/4/68, and 3/5/68, and 3/6/68, and 3/7/68, and 3/8/68, and 3/9/68, and 3/10/68, and 3/11/68, and 3/12/68, and 3/13/68, and 3/14/68, and 3/15/68, and 3/16/68, and 3/17/68, and 3/18/68, and 3/19/68, and 3/20/68, and 3/21/68, and 3/22/68, and 3/23/68, and 3/24/68, and 3/25/68, and 3/26/68, and 3/27/68, and 3/28/68, and 3/29/68, and 3/30/68, and 3/31/68, and 4/1/68, and 4/2/68, and 4/3/68, and 4/4/68, and 4/5/68, and 4/6/68, and 4/7/68, and 4/8/68, and 4/9/68, and 4/10/68, and 4/11/68, and 4/12/68, and 4/13/68, and 4/14/68, and 4/15/68, and 4/16/68, and 4/17/68, and 4/18/68, and 4/19/68, and 4/20/68, and 4/21/68, and 4/22/68, and 4/23/68, and 4/24/68, and 4/25/68, and 4/26/68, and 4/27/68, and 4/28/68, and 4/29/68, and 4/30/68, and 5/1/68, and 5/2/68, and 5/3/68, and 5/4/68, and 5/5/68, and 5/6/68, and 5/7/68, and 5/8/68, and 5/9/68, and 5/10/68, and 5/11/68, and 5/12/68, and 5/13/68, and 5/14/68, and 5/15/68, and 5/16/68, and 5/17/68, and 5/18/68, and 5/19/68, and 5/20/68, and 5/21/68, and 5/22/68, and 5/23/68, and 5/24/68, and 5/25/68, and 5/26/68, and 5/27/68, and 5/28/68, and 5/29/68, and 5/30/68, and 5/31/68, and 6/1/68, and 6/2/68, and 6/3/68, and 6/4/68, and 6/5/68, and 6/6/68, and 6/7/68, and 6/8/68, and 6/9/68, and 6/10/68, and 6/11/68, and 6/12/68, and 6/13/68, and 6/14/68, and 6/15/68, and 6/16/68, and 6/17/68, and 6/18/68, and 6/19/68, and 6/20/68, and 6/21/68, and 6/22/68, and 6/23/68, and 6/24/68, and 6/25/68, and 6/26/68, and 6/27/68, and 6/28/68, and 6/29/68, and 6/30/68, and 7/1/68, and 7/2/68, and 7/3/68, and 7/4/68, and 7/5/68, and 7/6/68, and 7/7/68, and 7/8/68, and 7/9/68, and 7/10/68, and 7/11/68, and 7/12/68, and 7/13/68, and 7/14/68, and 7/15/68, and 7/16/68, and 7/17/68, and 7/18/68, and 7/19/68, and 7/20/68, and 7/21/68, and 7/22/68, and 7/23/68, and 7/24/68, and 7/25/68, and 7/26/68, and 7/27/68, and 7/28/68, and 7/29/68, and 7/30/68, and 7/31/68, and 8/1/68, and 8/2/68, and 8/3/68, and 8/4/68, and 8/5/68, and 8/6/68, and 8/7/68, and 8/8/68, and 8/9/68, and 8/10/68, and 8/11/68, and 8/12/68, and 8/13/68, and 8/14/68, and 8/15/68, and 8/16/68, and 8/17/68, and 8/18/68, and 8/19/68, and 8/20/68, and 8/21/68, and 8/22/68, and 8/23/68, and 8/24/68, and 8/25/68, and 8/26/68, and 8/27/68, and 8/28/68, and 8/29/68, and 8/30/68, and 8/31/68, and 9/1/68, and 9/2/68, and 9/3/68, and 9/4/68, and 9/5/68, and 9/6/68, and 9/7/68, and 9/8/68, and 9/9/68, and 9/10/68, and 9/11/68, and 9/12/68, and 9/13/68, and 9/14/68, and 9/15/68, and 9/16/68, and 9/17/68, and 9/18/68, and 9/19/68, and 9/20/68, and 9/21/68, and 9/22/68, and 9/23/68, and 9/24/68, and 9/25/68, and 9/26/68, and 9/27/68, and 9/28/68, and 9/29/68, and 9/30/68, and 10/1/68, and 10/2/68, and 10/3/68, and 10/4/68, and 10/5/68, and 10/6/68, and 10/7/68, and 10/8/68, and 10/9/68, and 10/10/68, and 10/11/68, and 10/12/68, and 10/13/68, and 10/14/68, and 10/15/68, and 10/16/68, and 10/17/68, and 10/18/68, and 10/19/68, and 10/20/68, and 10/21/68, and 10/22/68, and 10/23/68, and 10/24/68, and 10/25/68, and 10/26/68, and 10/27/68, and 10/28/68, and 10/29/68, and 10/30/68, and 10/31/68, and 11/1/68, and 11/2/68, and 11/3/68, and 11/4/68, and 11/5/68, and 11/6/68, and 11/7/68, and 11/8/68, and 11/9/68, and 11/10/68, and 11/11/68, and 11/12/68, and 11/13/68, and 11/14/68, and 11/15/68, and 11/16/68, and 11/17/68, and 11/18/68, and 11/19/68, and 11/20/68, and 11/21/68, and 11/22/68, and 11/23/68, and 11/24/68, and 11/25/68, and 11/26/68, and 11/27/68, and 11/28/68, and 11/29/68, and 11/30/68, and 12/1/68, and 12/2/68, and 12/3/68, and 12/4/68, and 12/5/68, and 12/6/68, and 12/7/68, and 12/8/68, and 12/9/68, and 12/10/68, and 12/11/68, and 12/12/68, and 12/13/68, and 12/14/68, and 12/15/68, and 12/16/68, and 12/17/68, and 12/18/68, and 12/19/68, and 12/20/68, and 12/21/68, and 12/22/68, and 12/23/68, and 12/24/68, and 12/25/68, and 12/26/68, and 12/27/68, and 12/28/68, and 12/29/68, and 12/30/68, and 12/31/68.

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MAJOR UNITS SUPPORTED  
AS OF 31 July 1970

3d Bde, 9th Inf Div	ROKPV
25th Inf Div	4th Psyops Bn
11th ACR	6th Psyops Bn
1st Avn Bde	10th Psyops Bn
1st Signal Bde	IIFV
18th MP Bde	III MR Advisor
20th Engr Bde	IV MR Advisor
USA Med Cnd (Prov)	CMAC
199th Lt Inf Bde	HQ Command MACV
RTAVF	PA&E
COMNAVSUPACT	USAID (COORDS)
509th Radio Research Gp	1st ATF
5th Special Forces Gp	1st Cav Div (AM)

7th Air Force

MAJOR UNITS PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED  
(REDEPLOYED PRIOR TO 31 JULY 1970)

9th Inf Div (-)  
1st Inf Div  
3d Bde, 82d ABN Div

United States Army Support Command, Saigon

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Staff Missions

I. ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations: Assures that logistical planning, support of operations, and training and employment are being accomplished effectively throughout Saigon Support Command. Formulates policies and plans for composition and employment of subordinate units. Coordinates and supervises the intelligence and security activities within the command. Develops manpower and equipment requirements and forwards TOE's, MTOE's, TDA's and MTDA's to higher headquarters. Develops and implements the command historical program.

II. ACofS, Services: Coordinates and supervises activities in the areas of engineering services, laundry and bath, graves registration, and food services.

III. ACofS, Supply: Insures support of Classes I, II, III, IV, V and VII supply (less medical, avionics, and missiles) to Free World Military Assistance Forces and all other authorized customers within the Command's area of logistical responsibility.

IV. ACofS, Maintenance: Insures the accomplishment of direct and general support maintenance to all non-divisional United States Army units in Military Regions III and IV: Back-up direct support and all general support maintenance to division maintenance battalions; maintenance support as directed for Free World Military Assistance Forces and United States equipment on loan to the Army of Vietnam and organizational maintenance support to those units without that capability.

V. ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal: Exercises general staff supervision over all Retrograde and Property Disposal activities in Military Regions III and IV.

VI. ACofS, Transportation: Plans, coordinates and monitors the employment of available transportation resources for the movement of personnel and cargo throughout Military Regions III and IV.

VII. ACofS, Personnel: Assures efficient allocation, recruitment, utilization and management of personnel resources to meet mission requirements of the command. Establishes and administers the command safety program. Provides policy guidance for employment of local nationals, the use of nonappropriated fund activities of the command and for the command civic action programs.



5/ VIII. ACofS, Comptroller: Coordinates command responsibilities in matters pertaining to financial management; reports controls; automatic data processing; management assistance; staff finance; internal review, audit; and cost reduction.

IX. Information Officer: Advises the commander on all matters of public and command information efforts. Maintains liaison with civilian news media, USARV Media Liaison Office, HQ, USARV Information Office, Joint US Public Affairs Office and HQ, USMACV Office of Information.

X. Staff Chaplain: Advises the Commanding General in all matters relating to religion, morals and morale in the command. Provides staff supervision and direction over major subordinate commands, and installation chaplain activities.


XI. Inspector General: Inquires into and reports upon matters which pertain to the performance of the mission and the state of discipline, efficiency and economy of the command. Coordinates Annual General Inspections with Headquarters, USARV and Inspectors General of subordinate units to insure that all units and activities are inspected as required by regulations.

XII. Staff Judge Advocate: Provides all legal services for the command, including the administration of military justice, legal opinions concerning military affairs, legal assistance, claims, and advice on the standards of conduct as required by AR 600-50. Provides for general court-martial jurisdiction for this command and for Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

XIII. Provost Marshal: Maintains responsibility for all matters pertaining to Provost Marshal, military police and physical security activities.

XIV. Adjutant General: Renders administrative support to the command and assures that military personnel management, general administrative services and personnel strength accounting effectively contribute to attainment of the command logistical support mission.


# HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON




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
# UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON









# ORGANIZATIONAL CHART




(\*) ATCH for adm and/or log spt only

# **DELTA LSA & 48TH TRANS Gp**










# US ARMY DEPOT



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**PORT FACILITIES**

**I. SAIGON**

OPERATED BY: Saigon Transportation Terminal Command (ARVN) with 3 Stevedore Contracting Companies and a detachment of the 71st Trans Bn assisting as required.

FACILITIES: 3 deep draft berths and one LST/Barge berth, other berths available on opportune basis. 219,654 sq ft open storage and 243,608 sq ft covered storage available.

CAPABILITY: 2,400 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Contract/Military Highway/Rail

**II. VUNG TAU**

OPERATED BY: Alaskan Barge and Transport contract (MSTS) and 511th Trans Det, which provides checkers and security for US cargo.

FACILITIES: 2 deep draft berths, 6 deep draft anchorages, and beach space for LST/LCU, and barge discharge.

CAPABILITY: 3,000 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Included in AB&T Contract.

**III. NEWPORT**

OPERATED BY: 71st Trans Bn using Trieu Tiet Contract Stevedores.

FACILITIES: 4 deep draft berths, 2 LST slips and (7 barge sites or 1 RO/RO ship). Open storage 2,616,166 sq ft and covered storage 334,792 sq ft.

CAPABILITY: 4800 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Contract and Military Highway.

**IV. CAT LAI**

OPERATED BY: 159th Trans Bn and Ly Hai Contract Stevedores.

FACILITIES: 3 deep draft barges, (1 LCM on Dunnage barge pier)

CAPABILITIES: 2350 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Barges.

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PORT FACILITIES

V. BINH THUY:

OPERATED BY: 401st Trans Co. (ARVN)

FACILITIES: 1 barge site and one LST/LCU pier plus beach space.

CAPABILITY: 300 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Highway

(NOTE: US control at Binh Thuy turned over to 401st Trans Co. (ARVN) on 19 March 1970)

VI. AP PHU NINH (TAY NINH)

OPERATED BY: Detachment from 71st Trans Bn.

FACILITIES: 1 barge site.

CAPABILITY: 80 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Unit pickup.

VII. VINH LONG:

OPERATED BY: Delta Logistical Support Activity (440th Trans)

FACILITIES: 1 LST, barge or LCU.


CAPABILITY: 200 S/T per day.

PORT CLEARANCE: Highway and unit pickup.

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# PORT OPERATIONS SAIGON / NEWPORT

THOUSANDS OF TONS HANDLED




	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
HANDLED	162	167	155	148	169	161	191	203	154	207	168	153	128

The total STON of cargo handled at Saigon/Newport remained constant during the period October-March; however, an increase in tonnage handled is apparent for the period April-September. This was attributed to: (1) increased backload, and (2) high tonnage, low cube constructions materials (asphalt products, cement, steel) prevailing throughout the period.



# PORT OPERATIONS CAT LAI

THOUSANDS OF TONS HANDLED




	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
HANDLED	59.0	56.4	62.9	61.6	35.2	49.2	45.7	67.5	53.0	71.0	56.8	40.8	44.3

The total STON of ammunition handled at Cat Lai fluctuated throughout the period. The increase since the February low of 35.2 can be attributed to: (1) increased backload and (2) input previously planned for the Cambodian operation causing a high of 71.0 to be attained during July.

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# DAILY AMMUNITION TONNAGE HANDELED BARGE SITE



This chart reflects the daily US ammunition tonnage handled at the barge sites. Beginning with the high of 1791 S/T at Cogido in December, with few exceptions, the rates were sufficient to handle both discharge and backload requirements.

# HIGHWAY TONNAGE MOVED

THOUSANDS OF STONS

400

300

200

100

0

TOTAL  
STON MOVED

OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

234

288

304

305

289

270

270

269

252

259

290

238

197

The total STON of cargo, including port and beach clearance, port and beach local, POL, local haul and live haul, moved by military and highway transport assets during the period.

**CONFIDENTIAL****AMMUNITION SUPPLY SYSTEM**

Class V Supply arrives in country from off-shore reserves and from Comus in order to fill USARV requisitions. Ammunition which is scheduled for Saigon Support Command is unloaded from deep draft vessels at Cat Lai and then taken by barge to Cogido. Cogido receipts are trucked into Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (LBASD) which is operated by 3d Ordnance Battalion.

From LBASD the Class V stocks are distributed into four Ammunition Supply Points (ASP's) located at Phouc Vinh, Vinh Long, Soc Trang and Binh Thuy. The ASP at Binh Thuy is controlled by the ARVN, but the issue of US peculiar ammunition is controlled by the 550th Ordnance Detachment. The ASP at Soc Trang is jointly operated by VNAF (20%) and US Army (80%) personnel.

The primary means of resupply to ASP's in Military Region IV is by water. The ASP in Military Region III is resupplied by convoys. Secondary and emergency means of resupply come from air assets.

Class V support for units in Military Region III is primarily by convoy (unit distribution) to the user utilizing motor assets or by unit pickup (supply point distribution). In Military Region IV, Class V support is primarily conducted by means of unit distribution to rearming points. Support in the Delta is primarily provided for Army Aviation units.

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## UNITS TRAINED USING INSTRUCT AND ADVISE TEAMS

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<u>Units</u>	<u>Number Trained</u>
832d DSU	112
25th Log	110
834th DSU	162
844th DSU	156
836th DSU	97
835th DSU	97
240th Ord	300
844th DSU	85
835th DSU	97 (Revisit)
ARVN Airborne Spt Bn	164
845th DSU	85
834th DSU	164 (Revisit)
836th DSU	97 (Revisit)
831st DSU	192
833d DSU	183
837th DSU	187

## Operation "BUDDY" Training

Type of Training	Starting Date	Estimated Completion Date	Number of Personnel	Geographic Location - Unit
Maint Supervisors	6 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	3	SCN, MNAV Det 2
Engine Rebuild	6 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	13	SCN, MNAV Det 2
Technical Supply	6 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	1	SCN, MNAV Det 4
Technical Supply	6 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	1	SCN, MNAV Det 2
Deck Maint and Operations	6 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	6	SCN, MNAV Det 2
I & A Team	27 Apr 70	5 Jun 70	164	SCN, ARVN Airborne SpBn
Chief Engineers	30 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	8	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Engineers	30 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	9	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Crewman	30 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	3	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Boatswain	30 Apr 70	30 Jul 70	1	SCN, USA Harborecraft
I & A Team	4 May 70	29 May 70	85	84th DSU
Electric Forklift Operator	6 May 70	8 May 70	10	Cat Lai, 124th Trans Co
Engine Rebuild	26 May 70	26 Jun 70	8	Cat Lai, MNAV Det 2
Harbormaster Liaison and Commo Procedures	26 May 70	27 May 70	10	Newport, Harbormaster
I & A Team	8 Jun 70	13 Jun 70	162	834th DSU
60 Ton Crane Operations	12 Jun 70	30 Jun 70	14	SCN, BD 6232 Newport
I & A Team	16 Jun 70	20 Jun 70	97	835th DSU
Instrument Repair	16 Jun 70	22 Jun 70	2	IBN, 79th Maint Bn
I & A Team	22 Jun 70	1 Aug 70	192	831st DSU
Chief Engineers	30 Jul 70	30 Sep 70	8	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Engineers	30 Jul 70	30 Sep 70	9	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Crewman	30 Jul 70	30 Sep 70	3	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Boatswain	30 Jul 70	30 Sep 70	1	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Maintenance Support	17 Aug 70	25 Sep 70	183	833d DSU, Bien Hoa
Maintenance Support	28 Sep 70	31 Oct 70	187	837th DSU, Phu Loi
Multi-Fuel Injector Pump Rebuilding and Testing	12 Oct 70	16 Oct 70	8	IBN, HHC, USASUPCOM, SCN, Motor Pool
Searchlight Repair	15 Oct 70	Indefinite	1	IBN, 79th Maint Bn
6V53 Engine	3 Nov 70	6 Nov 70	25	Thu Duc, ARVN Arm Sch
6V53 Engine	16 Nov 70	20 Nov 70	25	Thu Duc, ARVN Arm Sch

# Operation "BUDDY" Training

<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Starting Date</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>	<u>Geographic Location - Unit</u>
POL Convoy Drivers	1 Oct 69	5 Nov 69	25	IBN, 64th QM Bn
I & A Team	3 Nov 69	13 Dec 69	110	25th Log
Laundry Machine Opn	4 Nov 69	3 Feb 70	20	IBN, 185th Maint Bn
Marine Mnt Tng	15 Nov 69	2 Mar 70	5	SCN, MAW Det 4
Hvy Boat Co	15 Nov 69	2 Mar 70	126	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Machine Shop	19 Nov 69	Mar 70	5	SCN, MAW Det 4
Tug Boat Eng	1 Dec 69	Indefinite	10	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Tug Boat Chief Eng	5 Dec 69	Indefinite	15	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Tug Masters	5 Dec 69	27 Apr 70	9	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Marine Eng	5 Dec 69	27 Apr 70	2	SCN, USA Harborecraft
POL Convoy Drivers	13 Dec 69	25 Jan 70	12	IBN, 64th QM Bn
I & A Team	15 Dec 69	24 Jan 70	162	834th DSU
I & A Team	12 Jan 70	22 Feb 70	156	834th DSU
I & A Team	26 Jan 70	9 Mar 70	97	SCN, 836th DSU
Radar Repair	27 Jan 70	Indefinite	1	79th Maint Bn
Xeon Searchlight Repair	27 Jan 70	Indefinite	1	79th Maint Bn
Tug Boat	28 Jan 70	30 Apr 70	8	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Boatswain	30 Jan 70	30 Apr 70	1	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Marine Maint	30 Jan 70	30 Apr 70	4	SCN, USA Harborecraft
Ordinary Seaman	30 Jan 70	30 Apr 70	3	SCN, USA Harborecraft
I & A Team	2 Feb 70	13 Mar 70	97	SCN, 836th DSU
POL Handlers Course	15 Feb 70	26 Mar 70	31	SCN, 836th DSU
Surveillance	16 Feb 70	9 Mar 70	24	64th QM Bn
I & A Team	24 Feb 70	6 Apr 70	300	3d Ord Bn
I & A Team	2 Mar 70	3 Apr 70	85	240th Ord Bn
Radar Repair	16 Mar 70	15 Apr 70	1	844th DSU
Searchlight Repair	16 Mar 70	15 Apr 70	1	IBN, 79th Maint Bn
Electronic Instrument Repair	20 Mar 70	20 Jun 70	3	IBN, 79th Maint Bn
Sheridan Fire Control	20 Mar 70	20 Jun 70	1	IBN, 79th Maint Bn
I & A Team	23 Mar 70	24 Apr 70	97	835th DSU

# CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SERVICE PERFORMED</u>	<u>NO. OF CONTRACTS</u>	<u>FY 71 PROGRAM</u>
Transportation	Stevedoring	2	\$6,403,200
	Tug Rental	3	1,242,083
	Y-Tanker & POL's	1	1,297,205
	Lease & Maint of Commo Equip	1	19,780
	Tug & Crane	2	170,400
	Repair of CONEX Containers	1	255,795
	Port Clearance	1	1,711,463
	Bus Services	1	1,740,622
	Rail Maintenance	1	86,192
			\$2,867,743
Services	Laundry	20	150,000
	Sewing	1	
Supply	ECMY	1	\$ 880,984
	Care & Preservation Facility	1	364,098
	Dairy Products	1	9,397,593
Maintenance	Repair of Office Equip	9	\$ 559,043
	Commercial Vehicle Parts Whse.	1	542,473
	Repair of Jungle Fatigues	1	91,439
	Tire Recap Facility	1	618,000
	Fuel Drum Repair	1	87,600
	Hvy Duty Equip Repair	1	9,272
	Repair of Forklift	1	5,775
		52	\$28,500,760



## ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL WORKLOAD FIGURES

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### Administrative Services Division

Classified documents processed	7,239
Secret documents destroyed	303
Messages received	15,085
Messages dispatched	4,112
Cash Meal payment books processed	5,764
Accountable forms processed	63,979

### Special Actions Division

Awards issued by other commands	380
Awards disapproved	77
Boards/Eliminations	107
Boards, RA, WO, OCS	51
Letters of Condolence	60
Serious Incident Investigations	110
Line of Duty Determinations	180
Escorts processed	16
Officer Efficiency Reports Processed	852
Indorsements typed	1713
Letters typed	642
Request for Orders typed	64
Tests given	14,653

### Personnel Service Center

Number of replacements	17,184
Number of DEROS losses	16,534
Foreign Service tour extensions	8,088
Emergency & compassionate leaves	1093/506
Ordinary leave	2,600
Early outs, Hardship Discharges	294/53
Compassionate reassignments	231
Discharges UP of AR 635-212	300
Medevacs	580
Marriage applications processed	62

### A Transportation Command Concept

The US Army units in Vietnam generally equate to a Field Army. Geography, lines of communication and the enemy have forced the creation of logistical "islands," the present support commands. Each of these resembles, to some degree, a Field Army Support Command (FASCOM).

As deescalation continues, it is reasonable to assume that the number of logistical "islands" will decrease. Further, Saigon Support Command will probably be assigned the remaining mission of one support command and, in subsequent stages, possibly a second and even a third. Saigon Support Command will evolve toward a Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM). One can visualize MACV as the unified Command, USARV as Theater Army, and Saigon Support Command as TASCOM.

Realistically, this process of evolution could occur within one calendar year. On this premise, Saigon Support Command must plan actively now for the assignment of enlarged missions which will begin to decrease in scope almost concurrent with their assignment. As Saigon Support Command becomes responsible for support of units in a larger geographic area, its customers within that area will diminish in number.


A crucial element in such a complex and fast-changing logistical situation will be the distribution system. In turn, a critical part of the distribution system will be the transportation service available to support it. This transportation service must be designed for a geographic area equivalent to that currently served by two support commands, and capable of rapid extension into a third. Ultimately, it must be capable of serving all of USARV. To do this, it must be given a high degree of flexibility to permit essential allocation, concentration, and/or diversion of transport assets to meet rapidly changing transportation requirements. This is achieved best by centralizing control and decentralizing execution.

Within a TASCOM, type organization centralized control of transportation services is vested in a Transportation Command which normally has a Movement Control Terminal Motor Transport and, when required, a Railway and/or Army Aviation elements. This Transportation Command already exists in the 4th Transportation Command. Organized under TOE 55-111, as modified within USARV, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Transportation Command (Terminal C), when properly staffed, is fully capable of commanding subordinate units conducting transportation operations on a progressively decreasing scale throughout USARV. During 1965 and 1966, the Command was responsible for transportation operations from QUI NHON to VUNG TAU and within the MEKONG Delta. Historically, the Command has proven its capability and flexibility.

Conceptually, the ultimate organizational configuration of a Transportation Command, subordinate to TASCOM, would be approximately as depicted on the inclosed chart.

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# A TRANSPORTATION COMMAND CONCEPT



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## FOOTNOTES:

- (a), (b), (c) - Reduce number of subordinate units in phase with deescalation.
- (d) - TTP's located along MSR's for change of tractors, repairs, etc.

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CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, (ACSFOR),  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

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